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ABSTRACT: I consider the relationship of Badiou’s schematism of the event to critical thought 
following the linguistic turn as well as to the mathematical formalisms of set theory.  In Being 
and Event, Badiou uses formal argumentation to support his sweeping rejection of the linguistic 
turn as well as much of contemporary critical thought.  This rejection stems from his 
interpretation of set theory as barring thought from the 'One-All' of totality; but I argue that, 
by interpreting it differently, we can understand this implication in a way that is in fact 
consistent with the critical and linguistic methods Badiou wishes to reject.     
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I 
Since at least the Theory of the Subject of 1982 (comprising seminars held from 1975 to 
1979), Alain Badiou has attempted in an unparalleled way to conceive of the political 
and ontological implications of formalism, subjecting the very constitutive structures 
of ontological being to the dictates and rigors of abstract mathematics.  One of the 
most significant outcomes of Badiou’s thought is his application of formal methods to 
what has also become an obsession of contemporary continental philosophy, the 
problem of theorizing the “Event,” or the transformative eruption of the essentially 
unforeseeable new into a given, determined situation.1
                                                     
1 The significance of this problematic of the event goes back at least to Heidegger’s discussion of Ereignis, 
the mysterious “event of enowning” that transforms in a fundamental way the basis for whatever is in 
being; in subsequent discussions, Derrida and Deleuze have each (in different ways) accorded their 
   According to a problematic 
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already developed and pursued by Heidegger, such genuine novelty demands, as well, 
a fundamental break with all that can be said with the language of the metaphysical 
tradition, including all that is expressed or expressible by the “ontological” language 
that comprises everything that can be said of what is.  For Badiou, in order to develop 
such a theorization of novelty as such, it is thus necessary first to model the 
“ontological” structure of being, insofar at least as it can be described, in order 
thereby to develop a rigorous schematism of what occurs or takes place beyond it.   
This attempt to articulate symbolically the advent of novelty which occurs, for 
Badiou, beyond the limits of “what can be said of being qua being” threatens to put 
Badiou, like others who have attempted to trace the “closure” of a “metaphysical” 
language that avowedly determines everything that can be said of what is, in a 
paradoxical and even self-undermining position.  This is the dilemma (familiar to 
readers of the early Wittgenstein) of the philosopher who would speak of what is by 
his own lights unspeakable, who would attempt by means of symbolic language to 
trace the very boundaries of the sayable as such in order to indicate what lies beyond.  
One sort of solution to this dilemma (which is, of course, not without its own 
problems) lies in the Wittgensteinian attempt to discern, beyond the ordinary 
significative function of language in saying, the distinct function of an ineffable 
“showing” that operates, most of all, where language exceeds its own bounds and thus 
falls into nonsense.  Badiou, however, solves the problem in a very different way, one 
that suggests a radically different understanding of the significance of formalization 
itself.  For faced with the dilemma of the demonstration of the unsayable, which 
cannot, on pain of contradiction, amount to a significative use of language, Badiou 
foundationally and completely disjoins the formalisms of mathematics from language 
itself, attempting a formalization both of all that is sayable of being and of what lies 
beyond this regime by means of the abstract (and, for Badiou, wholly non-linguistic) 
schematisms of mathematical set theory. For according to Badiou, where language 
cannot speak, the formalisms of mathematics, definable purely by their abstract 
transmissibility, beyond the constraints of any particular language, can nevertheless 
display the structure of the sayable, as well as the structure of the Event which 
necessarily lies beyond it.2
                                                                                                                                           
different formulations of the “event” a central place in their own critical projects.  For Heidegger’s 
conception, which I do not discuss in detail here, see, e.g., M. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: From 
Enowning, transl. by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Indiana University Press, [1938] 2000; and M. 
Heidegger,  Identity and Difference, trans. J. Stambaugh, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, [1957] 2002. 
   
2 There are potential problems here, insofar as this rigid disjunction between mathematical formalism 
and language, which indeed solves the dilemma on one level, nevertheless makes it virtually impossible 
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More specifically, Badiou identifies the axiom system of Zermelo-Fraenkel set 
theory as defining the regime of ontology, or the possible presentation of what is as 
such. 3  This interpretation then serves as the basis for his suggestive as well as 
problematic formal schematism of the Event, which, in breaking with these standard 
axioms at a certain precise point, also locates, according to Badiou, the point at which 
the ontological order of being is itself interrupted and surprised by the transformative 
eruption of an essentially unforeseeable novelty.  In the more recent Logics of Worlds, 
Badiou continues this analysis with a formal consideration, based this time on 
category theory, of the primarily linguistic establishment and transformation of the 
boundaries and structure of particular situations of appearance, or worlds.4
In both of Badiou’s major works, the interpretation of structures that have been 
considered “foundational” for mathematics thus operates as a kind of formalization of 
the limits of formalism themselves, which in turn yields radical and highly innovative 
interpretations of what is involved in thinking both the structuring of situations as 
such and the possibilities of their change or transformation.  One of the most far-
ranging of these innovative consequences of the interpretation of formalism, as 
Badiou points out, is that it renders the infinite mathematically (and hence, according 
to Badiou, ontologically) thinkable.  In particular, Cantor’s theory of multiple infinite 
sets, which is at the very foundation of contemporary set theory in all of its versions, 
yields a well-defined mathematical calculus which allows the “size” or cardinality of 
various infinite sets to be considered and compared.  This symbolism has, as Badiou 
emphasizes, profound consequences for the ancient philosophical problem of the one 
and the many, and hence for any systematic consideration (mathematical, ontological, 
or political) of what is involved in the formation and grouping of elements into a 
larger whole. 
  Here 
again, the possibility of any fundamental transformation in the structure of a 
particular, constituted situation depends on a formally characterized effect of 
ontology, a kind of “retroaction” by means of which an ontologically errant set-
theoretical structure allows what was formerly utterly invisible suddenly to appear and 
wreak dramatic substantive as well as structural changes.   
5
                                                                                                                                           
for Badiou to justify his own reflexive (and, necessarily, it seems, linguistic) interpretations of the 
schematisms themselves.   
    
3 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham, London, Continuum, [1988] 2005. (Henceforth: 
B&E). 
4 Alain Badiou, Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology, trans. Norman Madarasz,  
SUNY Press, [1998] 2006.   
5 It is thus possible to see in the radical consequences of Cantor’s thinking of infinite totalities the specific 
limitation of Levinas’ thought about the relationship figured in the title of his book Totality and Infinity (E. 
Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh, PA, Duquesne 
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By far the most mathematically and conceptually radical consequence of this 
definition of the set as a “many which can be thought of as one” was Cantor’s 
theorization of the infinite series of natural numbers (1, 2, 3, …) as comprising a single 
“completed” set.  With this single, bold, theoretical step, Cantor reversed thousands of 
years of theory about the infinite, stemming originally from Aristotle, which had held 
that such infinities as the series of natural numbers could only be “potential” infinities, 
never existing as actually completed wholes.6  Moreover, with the same gesture, 
Cantor also suggested the existence of a vast open hierarchy of ‘completed’ infinite 
sets, each bigger than the last, beyond the set of natural numbers itself.  For, as he 
quickly showed, the definition of a set already allows us to consider its subsets, those 
sets that are comprised only of some of the original set’s elements.  We can then 
consider the power set, or the set of all subsets; and as Cantor showed with the theorem 
that still bears his name, the power set will always be strictly larger – will contain 
‘more’ elements – than the original one.  By repeatedly applying the power set 
operation to the original, infinite set, we thus obtain an apparently boundless 
hierarchy of larger infinite sets, whose relations of size or cardinality can then be 
discussed and compared.7
At one stroke, Cantor thus both radically transforms mathematical thinking about 
the status of infinity and creates contemporary set theory by allowing that arbitrary 
multiplicities can indeed be considered to be well-defined and actually completed 
 
                                                                                                                                           
University Press, [1961] 1969) which in fact figures this relationship not as a conjunction but as an 
exclusive disjunction.  This is why, for Levinas, the phenomenological “openness” to infinity, for instance 
in Descartes’ argument, always points the way to a “infinite transcendence” that lies outside the possible 
survey of any totality.  If Cantor has succeeded in his formalization, however, this opposition is by no 
means demanded by the thought of the infinite, which can indeed yield a doctrine of infinite totalities; 
and hence, as Badiou argues, Cantor’s innovation can be the specific agent of the historical passage of 
thought about infinity from the categories of the mystical, transcendent, or religious (in which it still falls 
for Levinas) to a thoroughly de-mythologized and “atheistic” treatment of the role of the infinite in a 
finite human life.     
6 For more on this history, see A. W. Moore, The Infinite, Routledge, 2001. 
7 These innovations already led Cantor to pose what is, today, still one of the most notorious unsolved 
problems in all of mathematics.  This is the problem of the status of the “continuum hypothesis,” or of 
the relationship between the size of the ‘first’ infinite set (the set of natural numbers) and that of the set of 
real numbers, or of discrete points on a continuous line.  As can easily be demonstrated by means of 
diagonalization, the continuum is indeed larger than the set of naturals; the problem (to the solution of 
which Cantor labored for decades, but in vain) is how much bigger it is.  The continuum hypothesis holds 
that the continuum has the size, or cardinality, of the very “next” infinite set beyond the set of natural 
numbers (which has the ‘first’ transfinite cardinality, aleph-naught).  As we now know, owing to decisive 
independence results proven by Gödel in 1939 and Cohen in 1963, the hypothesis cannot be proven 
(Cohen) or disproven (Gödel) from the standard ZFC axioms of set theory.   
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wholes.  Yet how big an infinite many indeed “can” exist as a one?  Is there any 
limitation to the size of successive infinities formed by means of the power set 
operation, or does the hierarchy itself extend without any boundary?  And what, then, 
should we say about the existence and size of this whole infinite hierarchy of infinite 
sets?  As Hallett (1986) has recently shown, Cantor’s own thought about these 
questions is motivated, at least in part, by theological considerations, which led him to 
believe both that the well-defined infinite sets of the naturals, or of the reals, can exist 
as wholes in that God can indeed group them all together as unified sets (even if finite 
agents cannot) and that the whole infinite hierarchy of infinite sets forms an 
“unincreasable” totality that cannot be treated mathematically at all, what Cantor 
called the Absolute. This Absolute infinity is, for Cantor, “unreachable by any 
determination;”8 it thus inherits the position occupied in earlier theories, for instance 
those of Aquinas and the scholastics, by an absolute divinity whose magnitude is 
incapable of numerical or any other positive specification.  Thus, despite the radical 
innovation of Cantor’s theory in positing the actual existence as a set of any 
multiplicity (be it finite or infinite) that can indeed “be thought as one,” his 
understanding of the Absolute leads him effectively to posit that there are indeed 
multiplicities –- most notably, the multiplicity of all sets, or what we might otherwise 
call the “set-theoretical universe” as a whole -- that are “too big” to be thought of as 
sets at all.  In a later text, Cantor termed such “too big” multiplicities “inconsistent 
multiplicities” – reflecting the intuition that they indeed cannot (consistently) be 
thought together as Wholes – reserving the term “set” for the smaller “consistent 
multiplicities” that can indeed be thought as one.9
Although Cantor’s motivations in holding the Absolute – or the set of all sets – to 
be indescribable mathematically, on pain of contradiction, was primarily theological, 
subsequent developments in set theory themselves would bear out his intuition in a 
striking and deeply suggestive way.  The subsequent development of a series of far-
reaching set theoretical paradoxes appeared to show that it is indeed impossible to 
conceive of a “set of all sets,” or of certain other related multiplicities, as completed 
wholes, without encountering contradictions.  The first of these paradoxes was the 
one already discovered in 1897 by Cesare Burali-Forti, which appeared to show that 
the set of all orderable or “ordinal” numbers, considered as itself an ordinal number, 
must be both larger and smaller than itself.  Just four years later, Russell’s paradox 
   
                                                     
8 Hallett (1986), p. 39 (quoting from p. 176 of Cantor (1883)) 
9 “When … the totality of elements of a multiplicity can be thought without contradiction as ‘being 
together’, so that their collection into ‘one thing’ is possible, I call it a consistent multiplicity or a set.’ (1899 
letter to Dedekind, quoted in Hallett (1986), p. 34).   
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would put a closely related result in vivid form, as the demonstration of the 
contradiction that follows necessarily from the supposition that there exists a set of all 
sets that are not members of themselves.   
In the first pages of Being and Event, Badiou describes set grouping or unification as 
the result of a fundamental operation of “counting as one” which forms an indifferent 
multiplicity into a structured one that can indeed be “counted” or presented as such.10  
The outcome of this operation is the formation of anything that can indeed be 
understood as a presented whole with any structure whatsoever; all investigation of 
the effects of structuration and formation on any existing situation can therefore 
proceed from an investigation of the possibilities and properties of this fundamental 
“count-as-one.”  Following Cantor’s own terminology, Badiou calls the successful 
result of this operation – an actually existing set, be it finite or infinite – a “consistent 
multiplicity;” before the count-as-one, there are only “inconsistent multiplicities” 
which precede any formation into ones, and so indeed cannot be thought or 
conceived mathematically (or ontologically) at all.11  The distinction between 
consistent and inconsistent multiplicities, so described, is to be regulated, Badiou 
holds, by an axiom system that implicitly defines which sets can exist (and hence 
which multiplicities cannot be grouped as sets at all).12
This appeal to the axiomatic structure of set theory and the consequent need to 
avoid the formation as sets of any of the “too-large” inconsistent multiplicities forms 
the backdrop to the first and most general of the axiomatic “decisions” that comprise 
Badiou’s own systematic ontology.  This is the decision of the “non-being of the one” 
from which, as Badiou says, his “entire discourse” originates.
   
13
                                                     
10 B &E, p. 24. 
   According to this 
decision, “the one is not;” fundamentally, there are only multiples and multiplicities.  
These multiples can indeed, in general, be grouped into ones by the action of 
structure, or the “count as one”; what cannot exist, however, is the “One-All” or 
universe that would result from the grouping together of everything that exists.   
11 There are actually two distinct questions here: i) of what (if anything) “precedes” the operation of the 
count-as-one; and ii) of what (if anything) cannot be counted as one at all, on pain of contradiction.  
Cantor uses ‘inconsistent multiplicity’ primarily to describe ii); since he lacks any clearly formulated 
conception of the set grouping ‘operation’ itself, he does not explicitly extend this usage to i).  However, 
Badiou argues (pp. 41-43) that given an axiomatic definition of the grouping operation, we can indeed 
identify the two senses of “inconsistent multiplicity.” For more on these topics, see Paul M. Livingston, 
The Politics of Logic: Badiou, Wittgenstein, and the Consequences of Formalism, Routledge, 2011, especially chapters 
8 and 9.   
12B &E, pp. 29-30.   
13 B &E, p. 31 
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Badiou presents this axiomatic decision against the One-All as a fundamental 
rejection of the legacy of Parmenides and, indeed, of the entire ontological tradition 
he founded.14
The Russellian ‘theory of types,’ is one such device, as are the axioms of 
foundation and separation enshrined in the now-standard axiom system of Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory.  The intent behind all these devices is to prohibit the self-
membership of sets; in other words, they all prevent, at a basic level, the possibility of a 
set belonging to itself.  In this way, the “paradoxical multiplicities” or sets leading to 
contradictions are immediately prohibited; so, also, is the ‘total set’ or set of all sets.
  But although his rejection of the One-All is, like other significant 
decisions, axiomatic, Badiou does not hesitate to give a justification for it in terms of 
set theory.  This justification turns on Badiou’s interpretation of Russell’s paradox and 
the related paradoxes, which led Russell and subsequent logicians to seek devices to 
prevent the possibility of forming the problematic sets.   
15   
Badiou follows the tradition of logicians in both prohibitions, holding that since the 
existence of a contradiction would “[annihilate] the logical consistency of the 
language,”16
Inconsistent or ‘excessive’ multiplicities are nothing more than 
what set theory ontology designates, prior to its deductive 
structure, as pure non-being. 
 the problematic sets cannot be formed, or in other words that the 
problematic multiplicities, including the multiplicity of all multiplicities, do not exist as 
Ones.  The universe described by language is thus essentially and fundamentally 
incomplete; this result provides formal grounds for the basic decision “against the One-
All,” which, Badiou holds, must be maintained by any systematic, axiomatic theory of 
being itself.    Thus: 
That it be in the place of this non-being that Cantor pinpoints the 
absolute, or God, allows us isolate the decision in which 
‘ontologies’ of Presence, non-mathematical ‘ontologies’, ground 
themselves: the decision to declare that beyond the multiple, even 
in the metaphor of its inconsistent grandeur, the one is. 
What set theory enacts, on the contrary, under the effect of the 
paradoxes – in which it registers its particular non-being as 
obstacle (which, by that token, is the non-being) – is that the one is 
not. (p. 42) 
                                                     
14 It is “a decision to break with the arcana of the one and the multiple in which philosophy is born and 
buried…”, (B&E, p. 23).   
15 For, such a set, if it existed, would be (since it would be a set) a member of itself.   
16 B&E, p. 41.   
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Badiou is indeed right to hold that the paradoxes establish a fundamental result, 
transformative for all systematic consideration of the one and the many, in 
establishing the fundamentally problematic status of the attempt of traditional 
metaphysics to think an unproblematically unified totality, the traditional “One-All” 
of the universe of all that exists.    However, with respect to the formalisms 
themselves, there is an important alternative here which Badiou does not so much as 
acknowledge.  For as some logicians have more recently emphasized, it is not at all 
the case that the Russell paradox, for instance, simply forces the decision against a 
One-All or a set of all sets.  For we may, by means of various alternative devices, affirm 
the existence of the total set while nevertheless acknowledging the Russell paradox.  
One way to do this is to permit axioms allowing the existence of self-membered sets, 
including the total or ‘universal’ set, while still prohibiting the problematic Russell set 
itself.17  Alternatively, we may tolerate the existence of the Russell set and the other 
contradictory sets by allowing the existence of certain contradictions – contradictions that 
characteristically arise in the course of thinking, or talking, about the limits of a 
totality in which the act of thinking or talking itself is a member.18
In fact, the choice to affirm the existence of the totality, and thus to uphold the 
completeness of language in its capability of speaking the All, defines an alternative 
critical orientation, one which is also heir to the paradoxes but strikingly at odds to 
Badiou’s own.  We can see this difference particularly clearly, indeed, in relation to 
the status of another result that figures directly the consequences of self-belonging and 
diagonalization, Gödel’s (first) incompleteness theorem.  As we have already seen, 
although the theorem is usually called the “incompleteness” theorem, it in fact faces 
us with a decision between completeness and consistency.  Affirming the consistency of 
the formal system in which it is formulated (for instance, Principia Mathematica), we may 
take it that the result shows that this system is incomplete: that is, that “there are truths” 
that it cannot prove (such as, for instance, the truth of the statement of the Gödel 
sentence itself).  However, we may also just as well take it to show that the system is 
inconsistent, i.e. that there is some proposition, A, of which it proves both A and its 
negation.  In this way we may preserve the completeness of the system (of PM, or by 
analogy, the system of language itself in its capability to say everything) at the cost of 
determining it to contain inconsistencies.  Of course, this is not the route usually 
taken, since it has usually been assumed that a contradiction ruins the integrity of any 
system, since “from a contradiction anything can be proven.”  However, as we shall 
   
                                                     
17 See, e.g., T.E. Forster, Set Theory With a Universal Set, Oxford, Oxford U. Press, 1992. 
18 See, e.g., Graham Priest, In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, 2d Edition, Oxford U Press, [1987] 
2006, especially chapter 2, and Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought, Second Edition, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 2002. 
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see, this is by no means necessarily so, and depends in detail upon the structure of the 
logic of proof that is employed.  In any case, and even more significantly, although we 
may make the decision for consistency and incompleteness, or for completeness and 
inconsistency, neither one is mandated by the formal system itself.  For – and this is 
the precise content of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem – it is impossible for a 
formal system to prove its own consistency; it is thus always possible to take it, and 
impossible to foreclose the possibility from within, that it may contain inconsistencies. 
More generally, then, we might put the situation as follows. It is not in fact the 
case that the implications of the Russell paradox or any of the related semantic 
paradoxes immediately force us to reject, as Badiou claims, the “One-All.”  The effect 
of the paradox is rather to split the One-All into two interpretive hypotheses, and force 
a decision between them.  Either we may reject the “All” of totality while preserving the 
“One” of consistency – this is Badiou’s solution – or, alternatively, we may preserve 
the All of totality while sacrificing, at least in certain cases, the One of consistency.  
This alternative, as I shall demonstrate, essentially defines the possibility of a different 
theoretical/critical orientation, one which certainly shares with Badiou’s “generic” 
orientation his essential rejection of both constructivism and traditional metaphysics, 
but is nevertheless capable of underlying very different critical positions and results. 
II 
In a suggestive chapter from his 1998 book Briefings on Existence, Badiou describes what 
he sees as three possible “orientations in thought.”19   In each of the orientations, as 
Badiou notes, what is at stake is the relationship of thinking to being itself, the 
relationship famously named by Parmenides in the assertion that “The Same is there 
both for thinking and for being” or that “being and thinking are the same.”20
I call an “orientation in thought” that which regulates the assertions of existence 
in this thought.  An orientation in thought is either what formally authorizes the 
inscription of an existential quantifier at the head of a formula, which lays out 
the properties a region of Being is assumed to have.  Or it is what ontologically 
sets up the universe of the pure presentation of the thinkable.
 Each 
‘orientation,’ then, regulates this relationship, or this possibility of thought to 
comprehend the infinite totality of being, by authorizing in different ways the 
inscription or assertion of existence: 
21
                                                     
19 Alain Badiou, Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology, trans. Norman Madarasz,  
SUNY Press, [1998] 2006, chapter 2. 
  
20 Badiou (Briefings on Existence), p. 52.   
21 Badiou (Briefings on Existence), p. 53. 
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Since each orientation thus preconditions the thinkability of being as a whole, we 
may indeed take them to amount to a series of positional total relations to the infinite 
totality of what is, or what is sayable of it.  And then we may see in philosophy a 
privileged domain of reflection on what is involved in these different ways of being 
oriented toward being itself, of “setting up” or “laying out” what it means to be.   
What, then, are the possible orientations in thinking, understood as possible 
relations to the totality of being as such, or as sayable?  Badiou distinguishes among 
three. The first is what Badiou calls the “transcendent” orientation:  
The … transcendent orientation works as a norm for existence by allowing what 
we shall coin a ‘super-existence.’  This point has at its disposal a kind of 
hierarchical sealing off from its own end, as it were, that is, of the universe of 
everything that exists.  This time around, let us say every existence is furrowed 
in a totality that assigns it to a place.22
 What Badiou terms the transcendent orientation, thus, sets up the totality of beings 
by reference to a privileged being, a “super-existence” that assures the place of 
everything else, while at the same time obscuring its own moment of institution or the 
grounds of its own authority.  Thus, the totality is conceived as the determined order 
of an exact placement of beings, while it is covertly regulated by an exemplary Being, 
conceived as superlative, transcendent to the order of things, and ineffable in its 
terms.  Here, in a gesture typical of philosophy from Plato up to Nietzsche, the being 
of norms is assumed in the figure of a privileged, sovereign Being, while the basis of 
their authority is not further examined.  Here as well, infinity is thinkable only in 
terms of such a sovereign Being, as the transcendence or ineffability of a singular 
Absolute wholly beyond the finitude of human life and existence, whose excess is 
simultaneously cloaked with the aura of obscurity.  Without further ado, we may 
appropriate Heidegger’s term (and indeed his whole description of it) for this 
orientation: thus, we term it the “onto-theological.”
 
23
The second orientation is also one we have already discussed.  It is the one that is 
implicit in traditional nominalism, as well as in some forms of critical thought since 
Kant, but reaches its full methodological expression only with the twentieth-century 
linguistic turn.  This is the orientation that relates to the totality of what is sayable 
about Being by means of an explicit tracing of the structure and boundaries of 
language; Badiou terms it “constructivist”: 
 
                                                     
22 Badiou (Briefings on Existence), p. 55. 
23 Though the terms in which Heidegger describes the historical structure of thought that determines 
beings by reference to some one superlative being are thus useful for the current project, I do not treat 
Heidegger’s own “being-historical” critique of metaphysics and presence in any detail here. 
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[The constructivist orientation] sets forth the norm of existence by means of 
explicit constructions.  It ends up subordinating existential judgment to finite 
and controllable linguistic protocols.  Let us say any kind of existence is 
underpinned by an algorithm allowing a case that it is the matter of to be 
effectively reached.24
Here, with the “constructivist” orientation, the totality of the sayable is regulated by 
the discernable protocols of meaningful language, comprehensible in themselves and 
capable of distinguishing between the sayable and the non-sayable.  Thus, reflection 
on the (presumably determinate) structure of language yields a kind of critical 
enterprise that involves the drawing of a regulative line between sense and nonsense, 
or between the sayable and what cannot (by means of the determinate norms 
definitive of language as such) be said.  In some of its most exemplary forms, this is the 
project of a kind of limitative policing of the sayable; the verificationism of Carnap and 
Ayer is a prime example.  Here, the totality of the sayable is itself understood as 
comprehended by the determinate syntactical rules for the use of the language in 
question, and thus as not only a bounded but a finite whole, outside of which it is 
possible for the theorist or the inventor of languages unproblematically to stand. The 
methodological correlate of this orientation is thus the conventionalism that sees the 
totality of a language as wholly perspicuous from outside its determinate bounds, but 
forecloses or ignores the question of the possibility of language, or meaning, as such.  
Since it is always possible to stand outside a determinate language and specify its 
principles, it is always possible to exceed a determinate, bounded language with 
another one.  Thus, the constructivist orientation can grasp infinity only as the 
potentially infinite openness of a successive hierarchy of types, or meta-languages, each 
one of which can grasp all of those beneath it, but at the cost of its own possible 
capture by a still higher language. 
  
Finally, Badiou poses as the third possibility the “generic” orientation that 
determines his own project in Being and Event and elsewhere.  This orientation differs 
from the other two, at least, in insisting upon the relevance of actual and multiple 
infinities to our understanding of being as such.  Arising in this way from the event of 
Cantor’s discovery of multiple infinities, it takes into account (where the other two do 
not) the radical implications of the representation of the infinite totality within itself, 
what is figured in the possibility of diagonalization: 
The third orientation posits existence as having no norms, save for discursive 
consistency.  It lends privilege to indefinite zones, multiples subtracted from any 
predicative gathering of thoughts, points of excess and subtractive donations.  
                                                     
24 Badiou (Briefings on Existence), p. 55. 
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Say all existence is caught in a wandering that works diagonally against the 
diverse assemblages expected to surprise it.25
Thus, applying no norm other than formal consistency, the generic orientation 
relentlessly pursues, along the diagonal, the existence of all that which escapes 
constructivism’s limitative doctrine of thought.  Indeed, it is one of the most 
impressive accomplishments of Badiou’s Being and Event rigorously to formalize both 
the constructivist and the generic orientations in terms of set theory.  Badiou thereby 
shows how the apparatus of set theory leaves open the possibility, beyond anything 
constructivism can allow, of the “generic set” which, though real, is completely 
indiscernible within ontology, and hence also the possibility of the extension of any 
determinate situation by means of a generic “forcing” of the indiscernible.  This is the 
coup de force involved in Badiou’s appeal to Cohen, which he takes to authorize the 
doctrine of the Event that shows the inherent limitation of any constructivist doctrine 
and which ensures, for Badiou, that there can indeed be a doctrine of the advent of 
the radically new, beyond what any existing language can possibly figure.
  
26
III 
 
Badiou’s generic orientation is thus one that takes account of the paradoxical 
possibility of total self-reference, indeed passing through such self-reference to 
generate the doctrine of multiple infinities and draw out the transformative 
consequences of Cohen’s technique of forcing.  In so doing, though, Badiou takes the 
generic orientation to refute any critical appeal to the structure or nature of language 
(which he assimilates uniformly to the constructivist orientation).  Does it in fact do so, 
though?  Or is there, in fact, another possible method by which thought, figuring the 
radical paradoxes of self-belonging and totality that find expression in 
diagonalization, Russell’s paradox, and Gödel’s theorem, can relate to the totality of 
what can be said, or of what is?   
                                                     
25 Badiou (Briefings on Existence), p. 55. 
26 The generic orientation seems to be substantially original with Badiou, but there are important 
anticipations of its view of Truth as the result of the diagonalization of particular situations, particularly 
in the views of some of the mathematicians and formalists on whom he draws.  The most significant of 
these is probably Gödel himself, who took his own incompleteness theorems to establish the necessary 
existence of truths that, although they could not be proven by any formal system, were nevertheless 
accessible to human mathematical intuition.  There are also significant anticipations of Badiou’s position 
in certain pre-WWII philosophers of mathematics, for instance Leon Brunschvicg, and the  philosopher 
and resistance fighter Albert Lautman, who sought in his “Essay on the Mathematical Notions of 
Structure and Existence” to undertake a “positive study of mathematical reality,” drawing on the results 
of Gödel and the metalogical methods suggested by Hilbert’s formalist program. (See Albert Lautman, 
Essai sur les notions de structure et d'existence en mathematiques: Les schemas de structure, Paris, Hermann & Cle, 
1938.)   
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In fact there is another orientation, one that is fully cognizant of these paradoxes and 
yet does not refuse the relevance of internal linguistic reflection in the way that 
Badiou’s generic orientation does.  We have already met it: it is the paradoxico-critical 
orientation that operates by tracing the de-totalizing implications of the paradoxes of 
self-reference at the boundaries of the thinkable, or sayable.  That this orientation is 
indeed fundamentally different from Badiou’s, despite its common passage through 
the paradoxes of self-reference, is already suggested by the very different relation it 
bears to the analysis of the structure of language: that is, whereas Badiou’s generic 
orientation (officially at least) positions itself beyond or before all reflection on 
language and its structure, the paradoxico-critical orientation depends crucially, as we 
have seen, on the possibility of language self-referentially to figure itself by displaying 
its own structure (even if this figuring will necessarily be partial and paradoxical).27
With this in mind, we can now specify the most basic distinction between Badiou’s 
generic orientation and the paradoxico-critical one.  It is this: given the paradoxes 
that force a choice, whereas Badiou’s generic orientation decides for consistency and 
against completeness, the paradoxico-critical orientation is based on the decision for 
completeness and against consistency.  Thus, whereas Badiou’s generic orientation 
maintains the methodological aim of consistency at all cost, up to the point of denying 
the existence of a whole or totality at all, the paradoxico-critical mode typically works 
by affirming the existence of a totality (of all that can be said, or of the world, or of 
Being) and tracing the contradictions and antinomies that thereby arise at its 
boundaries.  It does not necessarily seek a resolution of these contradictions, but 
indeed finds them to be necessary to the structuration of the relevant totalities that it 
considers.  Thus, by contrast to Badiou’s decision against the One, paradoxico-
criticism can be considered to be committed to the relentless affirmation of the One, 
regardless of its being constitutively rent by the paradoxes of in-closure at its 
boundaries.  It is in this fashion that it performs its critical work, tracing and 
documenting the complex topology of in-closure without attempting to resolve it into a 
univocally consistent doctrine of being.   
 
                                                     
27 Thus, Peter Hallward (‘Introduction: Consequences of Abstraction,’ in Peter Hallward (ed.), Think 
Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, London, Continuum, 2004) perceptively suggests that the 
relationship between language and inconsistency motivates Badiou in his discussion of “presentation” 
and “representation”: “It is no accident that Badiou is especially careful to circumscribe the most obvious 
link between what we are and how we are presented, namely language.  If fundamentally we are speaking 
beings, and if language is advanced as the most general medium of our presentation, then the rigid 
demarcation of consistency from inconsistency collapses in advance; it is exactly this consequence that 
Badiou’s steadfast refusal of the linguistic turn is designed to forestall.”   
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Paradoxes at the limit of thought are contradictions; and I have argued that it is 
possible for a formal doctrine of limits to describe and operate with such limit-
contradictions.  If this work is to be possible, however, it is clearly necessary first to 
reckon with the objection that has, despite antecedents in philosophers such as Hegel 
and Marx who certainly acknowledge the existence of contradictions, almost 
universally prevented formal thought from countenancing the contradictions and 
paradoxes at the limits of thought and language.  This is the objection that a single 
contradiction vitiates the usefulness of any logical system in which it appears, and so 
that no coherent logical analysis of any contradiction is possible.  In a series of works, 
the logician Graham Priest has argued against this ancient prejudice, which finds 
expression in of the traditional principle ex contradictione quodlibet:  “from a 
contradiction, anything follows.”  If it were true, indeed, that the existence of a single 
contradiction could lead to any conclusion, then any formal/logical system that 
includes contradictions would indeed be useless, since it would be of no use in 
tracking truth or understanding the world.  Against this principle, however, Priest 
argues for the somewhat counter-intuitive doctrine of dialetheism.  This is the view that 
there are true contradictions – that is, sentences, P, for which both P and not P are true.    
In fact, as Priest demonstrates, it is perfectly possible formally to construct a 
dialetheist logic that tolerates contradictions in certain cases without allowing these 
contradictions to “explode” to the proof of any claim whatsoever.28  Such a logical 
structure is, as Priest has also argued in a more recent work, in fact just what we need 
in order to formalize the contradictions that seem necessarily to exist at the limits of 
thought and language.29
                                                     
28 Graham Priest, In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, 2d Edition, Oxford U Press, [1987] 2006, pp. 
53-72. 
  Such paradoxes arise directly from the recurrent 
phenomenon that, in order to speak about the limits of language (or think about the 
limits of thought) we seemingly need to stand both within and outside these limits 
simultaneously: thinking about the totality of the thinkable requires that we stand 
outside the boundaries, but whatever we thereby think will, being thinkable, again be 
within them.  This general situation – which Priest calls an inclosure contradiction – 
can be seen as underlying, as he argues, a wide variety of problems and puzzles in the 
history of philosophy from the pre-Socratics to Derrida.  With respect to the 
problematic of totality and limitation that Badiou pursues, its use is that it can 
effectively be mobilized in a critical mode by practitioners of paradoxico-criticism to 
model and interrogate the contradictions that characterize the totalities of the sayable 
and thinkable themselves.  
29 Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought, Second Edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002. 
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By arranging the four orientations, we obtain the following schema, which 
displays some interesting symmetries and relations. 
 
Language captures Truth   Truth exceeds language 
 
Paradoxico-Critical:    Generic: 
Completeness, inconsistency    Consistence, Incompleteness
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criteriological/Constructivist     Onto-Theological 
 
 
We can also give brief definitions of the four orientations, differentiated according to 
their attitudes toward the totality of language, the thinkable, or being: 
 
Paradoxico-critical: Any position that, recognizing reflexivity and its 
paradoxes, nevertheless draws out the consequences of the being of the totality, and 
sees the effects of these paradoxes always as operative within the One of this totality.   
 
Generic: Any position that, recognizing reflexivity and its paradoxes, denies the 
being of the totality and sees these paradoxes as traversing an irreducible Many. 
 
Criteriological: Any position that attempts to delimit the totality consistently 
from a stable point outside of it.   
 
Onto-Theological: Any position that sees the totality as complete and consistent 
in itself, though beyond the grasp of finite cognition.   
 
On the one hand, the paradoxico-critical orientation is clearly distinct, as we have 
seen, from the constructivist orientation that seeks to delimit being by means of an 
investigation of the fixed structure of language. Rather than promote such a limitative 
doctrine, it takes account of the paradoxes of self-inclusion (which make it impossible 
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to preserve both consistency and completeness simultaneously) in order to trace the 
fundamentally paradoxical structure of limits and limitation, up to the paradoxes 
involved in the fact that language appears in the world at all.  A closely related 
distinction concerns the question of a metalanguage, for instance a language distinct 
from English in which it would be possible to describe the structures of truth and 
meaning exhibited by the English language itself.  As we have seen, the criteriological 
orientation of Russell and Carnap, which begins by attempting to specify the bounds 
of a single language by means of a description of its rules, invokes not only one, but 
indeed a whole hierarchy of distinct metalanguages, each one necessary in order to 
describe the constituent structure of the one underneath.  Paradoxico-criticism, by 
contrast, refuses to countenance any such metalanguage, affirming (though it may 
indeed lead to paradoxes) that a natural language such as English bears within itself 
all the resources (problematic though they may be) for talking about its own 
constituent structures.   
On the other hand, the paradoxico-critical orientation is also distinct, as we have 
also just seen, from the generic orientation.  In particular, these differ fundamentally 
in how they consider the status of totality: whereas the generic orientation saves 
consistency by denying completeness, the paradoxico-critical orientation affirms an 
inconsistent totality, documenting the inconsistencies that inherently arise when 
language ventures (by a necessity of its own structure that can hardly be denied) to 
speak the whole as One.  In some recent remarks on Badiou that criticize mildly his 
formulation of the generic orientation, and suggest the elements of an alternative, 
Slavoj Žižek emphasizes the way in which this paradoxico-critical thinking of the One 
necessarily differs from the emphasis on multiplicity that Badiou’s generic orientation 
and other orientations of contemporary thought share: 
What the … extolling of multiplicity is missing is the noncoincidence of the One 
with itself, the noncoincidence which makes the One the very form of 
appearance of its opposite: it is not only that the complexity of its situation 
undermines every One – much more radically, it is the very oneness of the One 
which redoubles it, functioning as the excess over the simple one.  The function 
of void is crucial here: what explodes every One from within is not a complexity 
which subverts its unity, but the fact that a void is a part of every One; the 
signifier-One, the signifier unifies/totalizes a multiplicity, is the point of 
inscription into this multiplicity of its own void.  This is why every name is 
ultimately tautological: a ‘rose’ designates an object with a series of properties, 
but what holds all these properties together, what makes them properties of the 
same One, is ultimately the name itself.  Consequently, the One as the “empty 
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signifier” is the point at which, as Lacan put it, the signifier falls into its 
signified.30
As Žižek suggests, the ultimate point of the paradoxico-critical orientation is not 
really to insist upon the One rather than the many, but rather to show how the most 
rigorous One essentially becomes many as soon as it passes through the “unifying” 
function of language, thus producing the gulf between the sign and its reference.
   
31  
This radical gulf, present and unforeclosable beneath every ordinary use of language, 
is figured by the paradoxes of self-inclusion and self-reference that occur at the point 
of the manifestation of language itself, the point of a necessary indistinction between 
signifier and signified, where the very logic of language is manifest syntactically.  This 
problematic point, traced variously in the diverse structuralisms and systems of the 
twentieth century, locates both the system’s inherent excess and its possible 
disruption.  Here, it is apparently possible to speak, as Derrida once did, of an event 
consisting in the “rupture” and “displacement” of structure as such, at the point of 
redoubling that is also its very core.32
                                                     
30 In Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations: The Cadence of Change, Northwestern U. 
Press, 2009, pp. 192-93. 
  It remains to be seen how we should 
understand the relation of this kind of linguistically defined event to Badiou’s kind, 
stripped from any relation to language and verified by the uncompromising formalism 
31 Compare, also, these critical remarks on Badiou, in which Žižek seems to occupy, very clearly, the 
position of paradoxico-criticism with its denial of a metalanguage position and its constitutive assertion of 
the ‘internal’ gap introduced by the One’s relation to itself: “…there is a Kantian problem with Badiou 
which is grounded in his dualism of Being and Event, and which needs to be surpassed.  The only way 
out of this predicament is to assert that the unnameable Real is not an external limitation but an absolutely 
inherent limitation.  Truth is a generic procedure which cannot comprise its own concept-name, a name 
that would totalize it – as Lacan put it, ‘there is no meta-language’ (or Heidegger: ‘the name for a name 
is always lacking’) and this lack, far from being a limitation of language, is its positive condition.  It is only 
because and through this lack that we have language.  So, like the Lacanian Real which is not external to 
the Symbolic but rather makes it non-all from within (as Laclau puts it: in an antagonism, the external 
limit coincides with the internal one), the unnameable is inherent to the domain of names…The true 
materialist solution is thus that the Event is nothing but its own inscription into the order of Being, a 
cut/rupture in the order of Being on account of which Being cannot ever form a consistent All.”  
Accordingly, Žižek says, “we should assert” from a Lacanian position that “the ultimate ontological given 
is the gap which separates the One from within.”  (Slavoj Žižek, ‘From Purification to Subtraction: 
Badiou and the Real,’ in  Peter Hallward (ed.), Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, 
London, Continuum, 2004, pp. 178-79.)  
32 “Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that could be called an 
"event," if this loaded word did not entail a meaning which it is precisely the function of structural-or 
structuralist-thought to reduce or to suspect. But let me use the term "event" anyway, employing it with 
caution and as if in quotation marks. In this sense, this event will have the exterior form of a rupture and 
a redoubling.”  (Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences’, in 
Alan Bass (ed.), Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, London, Routledge, 1966, p. 278.)   
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of mathematics itself.  But such, it now seems, are the stakes of the still poorly 
understood fact of the appearance of language in the world, and of the questions of 
formalism and action that problematically manifest it.     
The two orientations at the top of the diagram both thus have it in common that 
they result from differing reactions to the paradoxes of total self-inclusion; in this 
respect they are distinct from the two orientations at the bottom, which must both, 
thus, be considered to be pre-Cantorian in maintaining the possibility of jointly 
preserving consistency and completeness.  However, the two orientations on the left 
also share something, despite being respectively pre- and post-Cantorian in these 
respects; in particular, both share a critical motivation grounded in reflection on the 
structure of language.  For both of these orientations, it is necessary, in understanding 
the possibility of speaking being at all, first to pass through (and do we ever emerge?) a 
deep reflection on language and its formal structure; it is in this way that they both 
figure the relationship of formalism to what is.  For the two orientations on the right-
hand side, Badiou’s generic orientation as well as the traditional onto-theological one, 
by contrast, the structure of language ultimately determines neither what is nor what 
can appear; whatever is consequent upon the structure of language per se is itself 
secondary to the existence of beings and truths which may transcend or escape it.  Of 
course, Badiou’s generic orientation is not thereby equivalent, either, to the onto-
theological doctrine of transcendence; whereas the (pre-Cantorian) orientation of 
onto-theology lodges truth in the privilege of a singular, obscure and transcendent 
super-Being, Badiou’s generic orientation sees truth only in the infinite procession of 
multiplicities, without end or higher synthesis.   
Thus we may group the two orientations on the left as critical doctrines of 
language; whereas those on the right are dogmatic doctrines of truth.  (I do not mean 
this term to be pejorative, here, but simply to indicate the point of their common 
insistence: that there must be some truth beyond language, whereas the orientations on 
the left are linked in refusing to consider truth outside its possibility for linguistic 
expression, however this possibility may manifest itself.)  
Finally, there are also revealing connections along the diagonals.  The diagonal 
from constructivism to the generic represents the common norm of consistency.  This is 
as much a norm for (for example) Carnap’s constructivism as it is for Badiou’s 
relentless pursuit of mathematical structures; it is marked in both in the absolute 
privilege of logical rules and the assumption that language, in order to discern a realm 
of Being, must maintain its consistency at all points.  From onto-theology to 
paradoxico-criticism, on the other hand, we may draw the line of totality (or 
completeness); for both orientations involve the assertion of an actually existent whole.  
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This is evident, for instance, in the very direct way that paradoxico-criticism 
interrogates the position of the sovereign Being that assures the order of the totality 
within onto-theology; for in order to interrogate the force and authority of such a 
sovereign, it is necessary first to acknowledge and then to interrogate its actual 
relationship to the whole (of which it is, invariably, also an element).  Just as 
profoundly, the diagonal line of consistency that links constructivism to the generic 
orientation denies or forecloses the existence of the totality by asserting the non-all, 
whether in the form of constructivism’s infinite open hierarchy of metalanguages or 
the generic orientation’s infinite procession toward the multiplicity of truths.  The 
point of crossing of the two lines is, once again, the paradox of self-inclusion (in its 
Cantorian, Russellian, or Gödelian forms), which makes it impossible to preserve 
consistency and completeness simultaneously.  
More generally, it may be possible to describe philosophical/political thought 
about signs and meanings, finitude and infinitude, as today standing at the junction of 
a critical either-or between  the two post-Cantorian orientations, that of the generic and 
the paradoxico-critical.  The two orientations touch on almost every important 
question of contemporary political theory, but they can be traced in terms of their 
divergent responses to a common beginning: the fixed point of the symbolism of self-
reference.  If this is right, then Badiou’s radical project, situated in the larger critical 
context explored here, also suggests a radical return to the deep and profound 
questions of the formal symbolism of reflexivity, up to the possible formalization of the 
structure of subjectivity itself.   
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